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GIFT8 CAUSA MORTIS-THE USE OF A WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT IN LIEU OF DELIVERY OF THE
THING IN GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
For a gift caitsa mortis to be valid, the donor must make
the gift in expectation of impending death, he must die, and he
must make some sort of delivery of the subject of his gift.'
The matter to be discussed here is the attitude of the courts
toward a constructive delivery by the use of a written instrumnent in gifts causa mortis. It is a well established rule that
only personalty is capable of being transferred by gifts cazesa
,zortisN;2 and since property which falls into this category is
generally subject to actual delfvery, it is to be expected that
the rules of delivery will be quite strict.
The courts of Massachusetts, Mlissouri, and North Carolina
have said that a written instrument will not satisfy the requirement of delivery for the completion of a gift caiusa nlotis.3 In
McGrath v. Reynzolds,4 the only case which actually presents
a holding to this effect, the donor signed a paper written by
the donee which said, "I give to Patrick MlcGrath *5,758, to
be divided as follows:" This was followed by a list of certain
of the donor's relatives, with a sum of money written beside
the name of each relative. The donor then gave this paper,
along with two bankbooks for nine hundred dollars each, to
McGrath and signed orders for this money to be given to
McGrath. He told McGrath that the rest of the money was
in the pocket of his trousers, which were hanging in his closet,
and that his sister would give it to McGrath later. MlcGrath
presented the bank books and the signed orders to the bank
1 In re Hanson's Estate, 205 Iowa 766, 218 N. W. 308 (1928);
Weiss v. Fenwick, 111 N. J. Eq. 325, 162 Atl. 609 (1932); In re Freeman's Estate, 290 N. Y. S. 7, 160 Misc. Rep. 133 (1936).
'Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 2 Sup. Ct. 415 (1882); Flint v.
Varney, 220 Iowa 1241, 264 N. W. 227 (1936); Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich.
185, 18 Am. Rep. 178 (1875); Gass v. Simpson, 4 Cold. 288 (Tenn.

1867); Thomas v. First National Bank of Danville, 166 Va. 497, 186
S. E. 77 (1936); Johnson v. Colley, 101 Va. 414, 44 S. E. 721 (1903).

'McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566 (1875); see Hamilton v.
Clark, 25 Mo. App. 428, 436 (1887); Smith v. Downey, 38 N. C.
(3 Ired. Eq.) 209, 215 (1844).

' 116 Mass. 566 (1875), cited supra, note 3.
L. J.-6
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before the donor's death, but it was not until after the donor
had died that McGrath received the rest of the money. The
,court treated the delivery of the two bank books as an actual
delivery, and did not mention the possibility that this in itself
might have been a constructive delivery by use of a written
instrument; but it said that since the remainder of the money
was not delivered before the donor's death, the entire gift
failed, since the written instrument by which the over all gift
was made could not satisfy the requirement of delivery.
The courts of the three above mentioned states, in laying
down the rule that actual delivery is necessary to complete the
gift, make no attempt to give an explanation or rationalization
for the position which they take, but simply state that such is
the rule. As is pointed out in Ellis v. Secor,5 it seems likely
that the requirement of actual delivery to establish a gift caitsa
mortis arises, not because of the peculiarities of gifts caitua niortis, but rather because of the tradition that delivery is necessar~y
to pass chattels by gift of any kind. Blackstone indicates the
attitude in the early common law toward delivery in making
a gift of chattels when he says, "A true and proper gift or
grant is. always accompanied with delivery of possession and
takes effect immediately, as if A gives to B one hundred pounds
or a flock of sheep, and puts him in possession of them, it is
"
The foregoing cases
then a gift executed in the donee
which adhere to this strict rule of delivery in gifts cautsa miortis
are comparatively old, the most recent one being fifty-seven
years old, and for reasons which will be presented below, it
seems possible, if not highly probable, that if the question were
to come up in these states today, the attitude of their courts
would be quite different.
The cases which hold that gifts causa nzortis can be effectuated without delivery of the thing when a written
7
In two
instrument is used are definitely in the majority.
r31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178 (1875).
'2 BL. COMM. (11th ed. 1790) 441.
,Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178 (1875), cited
supra, note 5 (where an envelope addressed to donee was fo'und,
which contained a paper signed by donor and reading, "I wish you
to take possession of all my effects, to do with them as you see fit.");
Kennistone v. Sceva, 54 N. H. 24 (1873) (where paper, delivered to
donees by donor, was signed and sealed by donor and signed by
three witnesses); Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N. J. Eq. 560, 134 Atl. 95
(1926) (where donor signed and acknowledged a deed assigning to
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(if these cases, the instrument by which the gift was made was
a recorded deed, ' and in one of them the instrument was under
seal," whl;e in the others the instrument used was not of a
formal nature.
Theie are many possible circumstances which would in-

dicate that it is satisfactory to allow the use of a written
instrument in place of actual delivery of the thing itself.
Quite frequently the actual delivery of the subject of the gift
is impossible; this would be true if the donor could not reach
the donee, or if the thing to be given could not be obtained.
The imminence of the donor's death, which is a requisite of
the g-ift caisa tnortis, makes impossibility of delivery more
common in this type of gift than it is in gifts inter vivos. There
are other cases where actual delivery, although possible, would
be extremely difficult, as where a man wishes to give to his
wife all of the livestock on his farm.'
In such a case, if the
delivery were actually made, it would amount to a mere
formalit;,, and would have far less value in indicating the
donor's wishes than would a written instrument, signed, by
the donor, in which he clearly stated his intentions.
The courts which allow this form of constructive delivery
are quite liberal in their application of the rule. They do not
limit its use to cases where delivery is impossible or difficult,
but hold that it is sufficient in all cases. There is some indication that the donor may continue to use the subject of the gift
until his death. In one case" the donor, during his last illness,
his son interest in a bond and left the deed of assignment with a
lawyer who was instructed to put it on record if anything happened
to donor); In re Braun's Estate, 200 N. Y. S. 781, 121 Misc. Rep. 18
(1923) (where donor gave donee a paper signed by donor and reading, "To my niece... I give as a gift all my personal property, which
I have in my possession during my stay in Germany); In 're Goodwin's Estate, 185 N. Y. S. 461, 114 Misc. Rep. 39 (1920) (where donor
signed a paper reading, "To you, Georgia L. Gardner, in the event
of my death, I give you the entire contents of my apartment . . .");
Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852) (where donor executed a deed
of all his personal property to his wife, consisting of stock upon his
farm, and choses in action, and had the deed recorded).
'Meyers v, Meyers. 99 N. J. Eq. 560, 134 AtI. 95 (1926), cited
supra, note 7; Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852), cited supra, note 7.
'Kennistone v. Sceva, 54 N. H. 24 (1873), cited supra, note 7.
*" Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852), cited supra, note 7.
In re Goodwin's estate, 185 N. Y. S. 461, 114 Misc. Rep. 39
(1920), cited supra, note 7.
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wrote to the donee saying that in the event of his death he gave
her the entire contents of his apartment. At the time, the
apartment was sublet, furnished, to a third person, and the
donor was receiving the rent from it.
The question of the delivery of the written instrument
itself by the donor presents an interesting problem. In the
case of Ellis v. Secor,12 after the donor's death a slate was found
in the donor's apartment with instructions written on it to look
into her valise. In the valise was found an envelope, addressed
to the donor's physician, which contained a paper, signed by
the donor and-stating that she wished to give all her possessions
to the physician. The court held this to be a valid gift caitsa
mortis despite the fact that the paper was not delivered. In a
case such as this, it seems that there is too great a possibility
that the donor was undecided, or that the donor had changed
his mind and therefore had not delivered the paper.
It appears that it would be desirable to have some requirement as to the delivery of the written instrument itself. To
make the requirement too strict, however, might prevent the
carrying out of the donor's desires in many cases. Perhaps the
most timely illustration of this would be the ease of a serviceman, mortally wounded in battle, who, in his last moments,
attempts to indicate the way in which he wants his belongings
to be disposed of. 13 There could be many such eases where
delivery even to a third person would be impossible. Yet certainly the courts would not want to interfere with the last
expressed wishes of such a person. Perhaps the needs of the
various situations could be met by a rule which would require
such delivery as was possible after the written instrument was
executed. That is, if delivery to the donee was possible after
the paper was written, that should be required to make the
gift complete; if delivery to a third person but not to the
donee was possible, then such a delivery should be required;
while if no delivery at all was possible, then none should be
required.
FRA.NK SELBY HuRST

Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178 (1875), cited supra, note 7.
"Many such cases are provided for in the liberal requirements,
of the nuncupative will.
1231

